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I N T H E UTAH COURT O F APPEALS
STATE O F UTAH

ROBERT L. JOSEPH,
PETITIONER,

BRIEF OF THE PETITIONER

vs.

APPEAL N O . 20010399-CA
PRIORITY No. (14)

SALT LAKE CITY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION, SALT LAKE CITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT, AND THE
CHIEF OF POLICE,
RESPONDENTS.

Officer Joseph was terminated from the Salt Lake City Police Department. Joseph
appealed his termination to the Salt Lake City Qvil Service Commission and was scheduled
for hearing. Prior to the hearing the City filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Failure to
Cooperate with Discovery. The City demanded evidence not relevant to the termination
hearing by exploiting alternative procedures under threat of dismissal. During a meeting
before the Commission Joseph was ordered to produce the irrelevant materials. The
Commission failed to issue a certified order to compel, and did not specify what materials it
required Joseph to produce. Joseph produced relevant documents and materials. The City
filed a Motion to Enforce. The Commission issued an Order of Dismissal before Joseph
could respond to the City's motion. The Commission violated Officer Joseph's due process
rights.

1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Rule 14 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedur^ and Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
(1) Whether the Commission effectively denied Officer Joseph his due process rights
when it dismissed Joseph's termination hearing without good cause.
(2) Whether the Commission's! order to produce unspecified evidence absent of a
written certified order was valid.
(3) Whether the City and Ms. Stonebrook used the Commission to extort, by threat
of dismissal evidence not relevant to the proceedings intended for other matters before the
Federal Court. Ms. Stonebrook with deliberate indifference to Joseph's due process rights
used the Commission to exploit alternative procedures.
(4) Whether the Commission acted with prejudice towards Joseph by allowing City
Attorney Martha Stonebrook to act a? counsel for the Commission in violation of their own
conflict of interest rules.
(5) Whether the Commissions!findings,ruling and punishment were inconsistent and
grossly disproportionate to the offense.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for issues (1),(2 ),(4) is a correction of error standard,
giving no deference to the Commission's decision. Taylor v. Utah Dept. of Commerce.. 952
R2d 1090 (Utah App. 1998); King v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 850 R2d 1281 (Utah App.
1993)
The standard of review for issues ( 3 ),( 5 ) is an abuse of discretion standard.
2

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1013; Child v. Salt Lake City C M Service Comm'n .,575 P.2d 195
(Utah 1978); Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Comm'n.. 949 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1997)
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES, AND REGULATIONS
United States Constitution Amendment XIV, Sec. 1
Utah Constitution Article XI, Sec. 5
Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1001 to 06
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (as ammended)
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1013
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-912
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-302 (4)
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 14
Salt Lake City Code. § 2.16.060
Salt Lake Civil Service Rules and Regulations, §§ 7-6-6; 7-6-7; 1-3-2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This case arises from the Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission's ("the
Commission") Order of Dismissal dated April 9,2001. (R 108-09). The Commission has
refused to hear Officer Joseph's appeal of his March 31, 2000, termination from the Salt
Lake City Police Department in violation of Officer Joseph's Due Process Rights. The
Commission dismissed Joseph's appeal on the basis that Joseph failed to comply with the
Commission's unwritten order to compel him to produce unspecified or unrelated evidence
by March 30,2001, under threat of dismissal. (R. 066-67).
B. Course of Proceedings
3

On March 31, 2000, Officer Joseph was terminated from the Salt Lake City Police
Department for allegedly being "unfit for duty." Officer Joseph filed an appeal with the Salt
Lake City Civil Service Commission o i April 19,2000. (R.004-7)
On March 15,2001 during a meeting before the Civil Service Commission, Martha
Stonebrook discussed dismissing Joseph's case for failure to cooperate with discovery.
Joseph's termination hearing was originally scheduled for March 22-23, 2001. Joseph's
attorney Eric Strindberg and Martha Stonebrook stipulated to set another date for the
hearing and agreed to a discovery cut off date of March 30, 2001. The Commission
suggested that if Joseph did not meet the cut off date of March 30, 2001, his case would be
dismissed. The Commission did not specifically identify what items of evidence it required
Joseph to produce. (R. 066-7). The Commission also failed to produce an order compelling
Joseph to produce anything. (R. 001-002).
On March 30, 2001, Joseph's attorney Eric Strindberg delivered to Ms. Stonebrook
258 pages of documents and other exhibits in response to the City's request. Ms.
Stonebrook had previously been informed that Eric Strindberg would be out of the office on
March 30, 2001, and would provide her with the two requested tapes on Monday April 2,
2001, after he had been given the opportunity to listen to the tapes. Joseph delivered the
requested tapes to Strindberg's office on March 30, 2001 and the tapes were delivered to
Ms. Stonebrook on April 2, 2001 after they were reviewed by Strindberg. (R. 110-11)
On April 2, 2001, Ms. Stonebrook, after receiving the 258 pages of documents and
two audio tapes, filed a Motion to Enforce Order. (The Commission never produced a
written order, nor did they identify aipty specific items of evidence that needed to be
produced.) (R. 071-75; 121-22).

On April 7, 2001, Eric Strindberg wrote to the Commission and stated that he would
befilinga Motion in Opposition to the City's Motion to Enforce. (R. 111-12; 124). On April
9,2001, the Commission issued an Order of Dismissal and effectively denied Joseph the
right to file a Motion in Opposition. (R. 108-9).
On April 17, 2001, Eric Strindberg filed a Motion to Strike the Commission's Order
to Dismiss. (R* 110-133). On April 19,2001, the Commission agreed to hold a hearing on
the argument of dismissal (R.190-214). On April 23, 2001, the Commission upheld the
Order of Dismissal. (R.216).
It is from this administrative hearing that Officer Joseph appeals to this Court on
the basis of Due Process violations and disparity on the issues of discovery. Ms. Stonebrook
and the Commission have violated Officer Joseph's due process rights by dismissing the
case and have attempted to gain access to evidence not applicable to the matter before
the commission by way of threat, exploitation and abuse of alternative procedures. (R. 067;
121-22; 126-27; 129-132).
Officer Joseph appeals to this Court to find that Joseph's due process rights were
violated and order the Qty to reinstate him as an officer or, in the alternative, to remand the
case to the Commission or independent body for hearing.
C. Disposition in Trial Court or Agency
On April 9, 2001, the Commission entered it's Order of Dismissal. On April
23, 2001, the Commission denied Joseph's Motion to Strike Order of Dismissal (R. 190D. Statements of Facts
BACKGROUND
Other Related Issues Before This Court
5

1.

Robert L. Joseph ('Joseph"), Petitioner herein, was employed by Salt Lake City as a

Police Officer on April 10,1997, thru (March 31,2000.
2.

On March 26,1999, Officer Joseph was involved in a shooting incident after a traffic

stop that led to him being charged with aggravated assault on April 19,1999 after
investigators claimed that Joseph was pot in any threat of serious bodily -injury at the time of
the shooting.
3.

On July 16,1999, Joseph was terminated from the police department after Internal

Affairs Investigators erroneously concluded that the evidence did not support Joseph's use
of deadly force.
4.

The charges against Officer Jcfseph were dismissed with prejudice by Judge Burton

on November 23,1999, after it was determined that the evidence supported Joseph's
actions. The District Attorney's officef concluded that Officer Joseph was justified in the use
of deadly force.
5.

On December 21,1999, Salt Lake City offered to reinstate Officer Joseph to the

police department and rule the shooting "in policy" on condition that Joseph withdraw his
appeal before the Civil Service Commission. Joseph was also advised that he would have to
drop his Civil Rights action against the City. Officer Joseph refused to withdraw his appeal
or drop his Civil Rights action against the City.
6.

On January 3, 2000, in a blatant act of retaliation Salt Lake City reversed it's position

and determined that Officer Joseph's use of deadly force was "out of policy" and imposed a
twenty day suspension and ordered Joseph to undergo a fitness for duty evaluation.
7.

As a result of many different problems and inconsistencies with the department's

case Joseph believed that the investigation was corrupt and seriously flawed, and that the
6

department was actively participating in spoliation of evidence, obstruction of justice, and
the violation of Joseph's constitutional rights.
8-

Officer Joseph appealed the department's ruling of "not justified" with the twenty

suspension to the Salt Lake Qty Civil Service Commission on January 7, 2000.
9*
10.

Joseph's appeal was heard before the Commission on April 11 & May 8, 2000,
On December 6,2000, the Commission issued it's Findings of Fact, Conclusions and

Order affirming the departments "out of policy" ruling with a twenty day suspension.
11.

Officer Joseph appealed the Commissions findings to the Utah Court of Appeals on

December 20,2000. (Utah Court of Appeals No: 20001111-CA)
MATTER BEFORE THE COMMISSION
Officer Joseph Was Terminated For Allegedly Being Unfit For Duty.
12.

On February 3, 2000, Officer Joseph underwent a Psychological evaluation arranged

by the City with Dr, David McCann*
13.

On February 28,2000, Connole suspended Joseph for allegedly being unfit for duty.

Joseph was disarmed and then escorted out of the building and was told that he would be
fired.
14*

On March 14, 2000, Joseph met with Connole at a pre-termination hearing and was

given information from the City's Psychiatrist, Dr. McCann for the first time. Connole and
Salt Lake Qty failed to provide McCann with a complete personnel history on Joseph.
Connole excluded merit ratings that were favorable to Joseph along with some letters of
accommodation. There was also a letter sent to risk management by Union President Greer
who made false allegations about Joseph. This letter was then sent by risk management's Jeff
Rowley to Dr. McCann. Joseph denied the allegations and stated that he had tape recorded
7

the meeting and gave several names oflofficers who attended the meeting that could refute
the false allegations made by Greer. The City failed to interview any of the officers or take
into consideration the tape. Joseph was not provided this information prior to the pretermination which grossly prejudiced Joseph's due process rights.
15.

McCann also had Joseph assessed by an independent assessment company, Dr.

Leslie Cooper, who determined that Joseph was not suffering from any psychological
problems.
16.

On March 31, 2000, Connole terminated Joseph's employment alleging that Joseph

was unfit for duty and posed a danger to himself and others if allowed to remain a police
officer. Connole failed to investigate the false allegations made by Greer.
17.

Prior to Joseph's employment with the Salt Lake City Police Department he

underwent extensive testing and evaluation. Joseph, successfully completed all the stages of
the evaluation and testing process, which included an extensive psychological examination by
Dr. Thomas Reidy from Law Enforcement Psychological Services based out of California,
who determined that Joseph was fit for duty and considered suitable for Law Enforcement.
18.

Officer Joseph had also underwent a post-shooting psychological evaluation at the

direction of Captain Folsom as per pplicy, by VRFs Michelle Myers on March 31,1999, and
was cleared to return to duty.
19.

Dr. McCann concluded that Jbseph was unfit for duty and stated that Joseph's

claims of civil rights violations by the Qty were unfounded "unjustified doubts*' and
recommended that he be terminated. McCann made his determination from information
provided to him by the Qty, which excluded the full investigative file, the information from
the dismissal of criminal charges, several positive (more recent) merit railings which

would conflict with his findings and Joseph's pre-employment psychiatric evaluation.
20.

Joseph, since being terminated on March 31,2000, has undergone two separate

psychological evaluations. McCann's conclusions were evaluated by Dr. Eric Nielsen and
determined to be lacking merit Dr. Nielsen is a recognized expert in fitness for duty
evaluations and has published many documents related to the field of law enforcement,
fitness for duty evaluations and post-traumatic stress. Dr. Nielsen published Salt Lake City's
manual on Deadly Force Policy, Shooting and Post Shooting Reactions which is still in
use.
21.

Dr. Nielsen referred Joseph to a Dr. Stephen Golding, University of Utah Professor

working in the field of forensic science and psychiatry. Dr. Golding has also invalidated Dr.
McCann's findings and determined that McCann has insufficient information to formulate
his conclusions. Dr. Golding has determined that Joseph is fit for duty.
22.

On July 17,2000, Joseph also had another fitness for duty evaluation for pre-

employment with another Utah agency and was determined fit for duty by Dr. Carol
Nudleman from Colorado based Headquarters for Psychological Evaluations.
ISSUE CURRENTLY ON APPEAL
Joseph's Appeal Before The Civil Service Over The Fitness For Duty Termination,
23.

On April 5,2000, Officer Joseph filed an appeal with the civil service contesting his

termination on March 31, 2000, for allegedly being unfit for duty. (R. 004-7).
24.

Salt Lake City has continually failed to produce items essential to Joseph's case not

allowing Joseph to move forward with his appeal.
25.

On March 15,2001, the Civil Service Commission at the request of Stonebrook

ordered Joseph to produce two tapes. One tape was ofJoseph's interview with Dr. McCann
9

on his fitness for duty evaluation, the other was of a meeting between Joseph and Chief
Connole. There was no hearing to discuss the relevancy of the tapes. The Commission
ordered Joseph to produce the tapes under threat of dismissal. There was no written order
produced by the commission to compel.
26.

Officer Joseph was deposed in a Federal civil rights case, Scott vs. Salt Lake City, on

March 26, 27 & 29,2001. During depositions it was disclosed by Officer Joseph that he
had made many tapes of conversations between Joseph and City employees. It was
also discovered that other conversations had been recorded between Joseph and State
investigators. It was disclosed by Joseph that the contents of the tapes were harmful to
the credibility of Salt Lake City's investigation into Joseph's shooting. Scott's attorneys
requested that the tapes be provided to them in the course of discovery. Joseph's attorneys
Bruce Oliver and Roger Bullock argued that the tapes had no relevance in this matter but
agreed to provide some of the tapes after they had a chance to review them, Joseph's
attorneys informed Scott's attorney that it would take some time to review the tapes before
they could turn the relevant ones over. (R. 073-74; 110-12).
27.

Stonebrook was present during the depositions and confronted Joseph's attorney,

Bruce Oliver, and demanded the tapes. Oliver informed Stonebrook that he would not turn
over anything until he personally had the opportunity to review the tapes. Stonebrook then
threatened to dismiss Joseph's termination hearing before the Civil Service Commission if
the tapes were not turned over to her. (R. 129-132; 095-6).
28.

The following day, March 30, 2001, Stonebrook demanded that Joseph's civil service

attorney, Erik Strindberg produce all the tapes by 6:00 p.m or she would have die
Commission dismiss Joseph's termination hearing. Strindberg informed Stonebrook that
10

the tapes were not relevant to Joseph's termination hearing and reminded Stonebrook that
she had already stipulated that the commission would not hear evidence related to Joseph's
shooting incident and that the only issue that will be addressed before the Commission
would be Joseph's fitness for duty. Strindberg also argued that there was no official order by
the Commission to compel, nor did the Commission ever identify what tapes or documents
they wanted. Strindberg also pointed out that the tapes were part of Joseph's civil rights case
against Salt Lake City and that they would be produce in due time through the proper
discovery procedures. (R.121-22; 099).
29.

Strindberg argued that the request was unreasonable, broad and overly burdensome

for Joseph to produce all the tapes. Even if the order from the commission was valid it
would have been impossible for Joseph to duplicate the tapes in time to satisfy the City's
unreasonable expectations. (Ms. Stonebrook has since been provided with 37 tapes with
over 80 conversations in the Scott v. Salt Lake City case). (R.111; 106-7).
30.

Officer Joseph had produced items for Ms. Stonebrook on previous occasions but

was unable to produce Dr. Golding's report because Ms. Stonebrook in return failed to
produce documents such as Joseph's complete pre-employment evaluation, correspondence
between Dr. McCann and the City and Joseph's most recent merit evaluation by Sergeant
Scott White which were crucial to Joseph's case and essential for Dr. Golding's evaluation of
officer Joseph. As of March 15, 2001, these items among others had not been provided by
Ms. Stonebrook and the hearing was scheduled for March 22-23,2001. Joseph's last request
for these documents was on April 2, 2001, just days before the Commission dismissed the
case. (See Request for Transcript filed May 16, 2001).
31.

On February 29,2000, in a motion hearing before the civil service on the deadly force
11

matter the Commission refused to enforce a subpoena compelling the City to produce
certain documents relevant to Joseph's case that would show that the City acted arbitrarily
by ruling him not justified in the use of deadly force* The City argued that the documents
were not relevant to Joseph's case and) to produce the documents would be overly
burdensome.
32.

The Commission has once again shown that they have a predisposed prejudice to the

City's self-serving interests in violation ofJoseph's due process rights by failing to act on the
evidence and continuously demonstrating that they cannot act impartially. (R. 198).
33.

Stonebrook used the Civil Service Commission in an attempt to get the tapes, not

relevant to Joseph's termination hearing, because the tapes are harmful to the City's
case, Joseph vs. Salt Lake City and Scott vs Salt Lake City. Stonebrook was advised by
Joseph's attorney's, Bruce Oliver and Roger Bullock that relevant tapes would be turned
over to Scott's attorney and to the Cil[y after they have had the opportunity to first review
the tapes. (R. I l l ; 126-27).
34.

Salt Lake City "Stonebrook" alnd the Civil Service failed to produce a certified

order to compel Joseph to do anything, and then violated Joseph's due process rights by
threatening an unlawful action as a means of intimidation, once again bringing into question
the integrity of the Civil Service Commission. (R. 118; 001-02).
35.

Ms. Stonebrook and the Commission have violated Officer Joseph's due process

rights by refusing to hear the case and have attempted to gain access to evidence not
applicable to the matter before the Commission by way of threat, explo itation and abuse of
alternative procedures. (R. 106-07).
36.

On March 30, 2001, Joseph's alttorney Eric Strindberg delivered Stonebrook 258
12

pages of documents and other exhibits in response to the City's request. Stonebrook had
previously been informed that Eric Strindberg would be out of the office on March 30, 2001
and would provide her with the two requested tapes on Monday April 2, 2001, after he had
been given the opportunity to listen to the tapes. Joseph delivered the requested tapes to
Strindberg's office on March 30, 2001, and the tapes were delivered to Stonebrook on April
2, 2001, after they were reviewed by Strindberg. (R. 110-11)
37.

On April 2, 2001, Ms. Stonebrook after receiving the 258 pages of documents and

two audio tapes filed a Motion to Enforce Order. (The Commission never produced a
written order, nor did they identify any specific items of evidence that needed to be
produced.) (R. 071-75; 066-67).
38.

On April 4, 2001, Strindberg notified the Civil Service Commission and informed

them that he intended filing a motion in opposition to the City's motion to enforce the
order. (R. 124).
39.

On April 9,2001, the Civil Service with deliberate indifference for Joseph's due

process rights, dismissed the termination hearing without giving Joseph opportunity to
respond to the City's motion to enforce the Commission's alleged order. (R. 108-09).
40.

On April 17, 2001, Joseph filed a Motion to Strike Order of Dismissal and allow

the Hearing to go Forward.(R. 110-132).
41.

On April 19, 2001, the Commission heard arguments from Strindberg against the

Order of Dismissal. The Commission denied Joseph's Motion to Strike and enforced it's
original order on April 23, 2001. (R. 190-214).
42.

On May 7,2001, Joseph filed a Petition for Review with the Utah Court of Appeals,

pursuant to Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann* § 10-313

1012.5.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Commission effectively denied Officer Joseph his due process rights when they
dismissed Joseph's termination hearin|g without good cause.
The Commission acted arbitrarily and with bias in matters of evidence and allowed
the City and Ms. Stonebrook to abuse Joseph's due process rights while serving their own
interests. The Commission failed to produce an official certified order compelling Joseph
to do anything, nor did the Commission identify what items of evidence it required him to
produce and what their relevance was) to the appeal.
The City and Ms. Stonebrook used the Commission to extort by threat of dismissal
evidence not relevant to the proceedings and intended for other matters before the Federal
Court. Ms. Stonebrook with deliberate indifference to Joseph's due process rights used the
Commission to exploit alternative procedures.
The Commission acted with prejudice against Joseph by allowing City Attorney
Martha Stonebrook to act as counsel! for the Commission in violation of their own rules
being in clear conflict of interest
The Commission abused it's discretion and acted with bias when it dismissed
Joseph's appeal without a hearing. Tne Commission's findings, ruling and punishment are
inconsistent and grossly disproportionate to the offense.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COMMISSION VIOLATE^ OFFICER TOSEPH'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
The Petitioner has a property) interest in continued public employment and is
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entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before any deprivation of that interest
The Commission did not afford due process consistent with that required in Utah Code
Ann, § 10-3-1012 (1996)
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no
state shall deprive any person of property without due process of law. See U.S. Const
Amend. XIV, Sec. 1. While the Constitution guarantees due process before the deprivation
of property interests, such interests are not created by the Constitution, Rather, property
interests "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law.ftBoard of Regents v. Roth. 408
U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709 (1972). "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He [or she] must have more
than a unilateral expectation of it. He [or she] must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it." Id.
In Board of Regents v. Roth, the United States Supreme Court stated that public
employees have a property interest in continued employment if contractual or statutory
provisions guarantee continued employment absent "sufficient cause" for discharge. See id.
at 576-78, 92 S. Ct at 2708-10. If a property interest in continued employment exists, then
the employee is entitled to procedures comporting with the minimum requirements of due
process, as provided in the Constitution, See Cleveland Bd. of Educ, v. LoudermilL 470 U.S.
532, 541,105 S. Ct 1487,1492 (1985) (m[M]inimum (procedural] requirements [are] a matter
of federal law[;] they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own
procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official
action/" (quoting Vitek v. Jones. 445 U.S. 480, 491,100 S. Ct. 1254,1263 (1980))). If no
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property interest exists, then the employee must rely solely upon any procedural protections
afforded by contract, ordinance, or state statute.
In this case, the Court should look to state law, specifically the Civil Service statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 (1996), to determine whether Joseph has a property interest in
continued employment as a police officer absent "sufficient cause" for discharge. Section
10-3-1012 provides, in pertinent part:
All persons in the classified civjil service may be suspended as provided in Section
10-3-912, or removed from office or employment by the head of the department for
misconduct, incompetency, failure to perform his [or her] duties, or failure to observe
properly the rules of the department, but subject to appeal by the suspended or
discharged person to the civil service commission
which shall fully hear and
determine the matter. Utah Gpde Ann. § 10-3-1012 (1996) (emphasis added).
The statute specifically lists the reasons for which a civil service employee may be
discharged. The reasons supporting discharge are clearly directed at employee behavior that
"is detrimental to the efficiency of the employing agency." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,
162-63, 94 S. Ct 1633,1648-49 (1974) (interpreting statute providing for discharge for "such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service" to prohibit discharge "without cause").
This language, with "unmistakable clarity," grants civil service employees security against
discharge "without cause,"id. at 154, ^4 S. Ct at 1644, and thus limits both the department
heads and the Commission's discretion in making employment decisions. See Marvin v.
King. 734 R Supp. 346, 354 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (stating Commission cannot base discharge on
"arbitrary matter [upon] which employers of at-will employees are free to base their
employment decisions"); Boreen v. Ghristensen. 884 P.2d 761, 767 (Mont. 1994). Therefore,
as a civil service employee, Joseph hajs a vested right to continued employment absent a legal
came for termination.
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On April 2, 2001 the Cityfiledit's Motion to Enforce. The Petitioner, through his
attorney, immediately contacted the Civil Service Commission, through it's coordinator^
Celina Mendez-Castillo, and indicated that he intended on opposing the Motion to Enforce
and would file a Memorandum in Opposition within two weeks. Notwithstanding the
Petitioner's letter to the Commission, five days later, on April 9, 2001 before the Petitioner
could file a Memorandum in Opposition to the City's motion, the Commission entered its
Order of Dismissal for allegedly failure to cooperate with discovery. (R. 071-107; 124; 110132).
Entering an "Order of Dismissal" before the Petitioner can be heard is clearly a
violation of the Petitioner's right to due process. It is ^incontroverted that the Petitioner is
entitled to a full and fair hearing on his grievance. See Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service
Commission. 949 P.2d 1046 (Utah App. 1997). This, by necessity includes the right to be
heard on all matters which affect the Petitioner's right to a hearing. The Petitioner was
denied the opportunity to be heard on the matter of the City's Motion to Dismiss. The
Commission is so ruling, effectively and with deliberate indifference to the Petitioner,
deprived him of his due process rights. The Petitioner as a Civil Service employee, is entitled
to due process, as guaranteed by both the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution.
Although the Commission is not bound by formal rules, due process requires that in
a full post-termination hearing, an employee be given an opportunity to introduce evidence
and cross-examine witnesses, which includes challenging witness credibility. See Post v.
Harper. 980 F.2d 491,493 (8th Or. 1992).
It is well established in civil proceedings that both parties have a right to be heard
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on any motions before the court, before the court can rule on those motions. In American
Vending Services v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1995), the Morses files a motion for an
award of attorney's fees. The opposing party filed a memorandum in opposition to the
motion. Before the Morses could file a reply memorandum in support of their initial motion,
the court ruled. Although the only issue was the failure of the court to allow and to consider
a second reply memorandum, the Court of Appeals still ruled that the tcial court had erred:
It is equally clear that the trial court failed to consider the Morses'
reply memorandum and its revised attorney's fee affidavit. The trial
court stated: "[A]nd not having considered defendant's reply
memorandum and the additional affidavit of James L. Christensen."
The trial court therefore erred by entering its decision before the
time allowed under Rule 4-501 to file a reply memorandum had
expired and not reconsidering its decision by reviewing the
Morses' reply memorandum and revised affidavit.
Id. at 926.
Here, the action of the Comnddssion in prematurely entering an order is a much more
serious violation of the Petitioner's rights. This was not a case where the Petitioner was not
allowed to file a second reply or memorandum. Rather, the Petitioner was denied the
fundamental right to be heard on a optical issue: Whether the very appeal should be
dismissed.
The actions of the Commission in this matter are not dissimilar to those that the
Court of Appeals found so troubling in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23
(Utah App. 1991) . In that case Tolman, whose discharge was being heard by die Salt Lake
County Civil Service Commission, contended that the Commission had failed to consider
certain legal points that he had raised at the hearing. The Commission apparently ignored
the legal points and refused to addrqss them at all. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
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failure of the Commission in Tolman to consider the legal issues raised by Tolman's motion
was a violation of Tolman's right to due process. Id. at 32.
The same violation occurred when the Commission ruled to dismiss Joseph's
termination appeal without considering his points and issues. This Court should find that
the Commission acted with prejudice and bias when it dismissed the Petitioner's appeaL The
Court should further conclude as a matter of law, that the Commission violated the
Petition's fundamental Constitutional rights to due process.
(A). The Commission violated its own rules by failing to certify or produce
an Order to Compel Officer Joseph to do anything.
Pre-termination due process requires notice of the charges, an explanation of the
evidence, and an opportunity to respond. To give effect to these constitutional protections,
public agencies such as the Department and the Commission promulgate rules and
regulations governing disciplinary procedures. "In disciplinary proceedings, a public body
must comply with its own rules and an employee being disciplined is entided to rely upon
those rules." Bell v. Civil Serv. Comm'n. 515 N.E,2d 248, 252 (111. Ct. App. 1987). In the case
of Officer Joseph, the Commission failed to comply with its own rules when it failed to
produce a written order to compel him to produce specific items of evidence, nor did the
Commission identify what items of evidence it required.
The Salt Lake City Civil Service Rules and Regulations require that orders in matters
dealing with disciplinary action be written orders. See Salt Lake City Civil Service
Commission, Rules and Regulations 7-6-7. Commission Decisions. (1997):
1.

Written Decisions. Following the hearing, the Commission shall meet in a
duly noticed, closed meeting to deliberate and reach a decision. The ruling of
the Commission shall be based on a majority vote of the members. In nondisciplinary appeals, the Commission may issue its decision on the record,
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which will be reflected iji the official minutes of the meeting, or, in its
discretion, it may prepare a written decision which will become part of the
record. In disciplinary appeals, the written Findings of fact Conclusions of
Law and Order shall bejprepared by the Commission. The Commission may
order the prevailing parity to prepare a draft of a decision or Findings of fact,
conclusions of Law and Order to assist the Commission in preparing its final
decision and order. (Erpphases added).
In the Memorandum Decision issued by this Court on November 16, 2000 in the
matter of Robert L. Joseph v. Salt Lake Civil Service Commission; and Salt Lake City
Corporation, Police Department, (See Utah Court of Appeals Case No: 200007 29-CA) the
Court ruled that the Commission failed to certify its order and comply with the Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Before Judges Greenwood, Orme, an# Thorne.
PER CURIAM:
Under applicable law,
[t]he finding and decisibn of the civil service commission upon the hearing
shall be certified to the! head of the department from whose order the appeal
is taken, and shall be final and immediately enforced by him.
According to the records from the Civil Service Commission, the "Findings of fact,
Conclusions, and Order" was signed by the chairperson of the Commission on July
19, 2000. Salt Lake City argue^ that Joseph had to file his notice of appeal within
thirty days ofJuly 19 th. HOWJ er, there is no indication in the record that the order
was "certified to the head of e department," an apparent prerequisite to finality.
Moreover, the order is not date-stamped. The cases to which Salt Lake City cites, in
support of its assertion that Joseph's notice of appeal was late, stand for proposition
that an agency order is final tflie day it is issued, not the day it is mailed. See e.g..
Bonded Bicycle Couriers v. Diep't of Employment Sec. 844 P.2cl 358 (Utah Ct. App.
1992). However, these cases iiivolve agency orders that were properly issued and
date-stamped. Id. at 360 (reiterating supreme court's determination that "the date the
order constituting final agency action issue is the date the order bears on its face.")
Analogous agency cases have (likewise required a mailing certificate showing that the
claimant was given notice ana an opportunity to file a timely appeal. See e.g.
Buczynski v. Industrial ComiW 917 P. 2d 552, 555 (Utah 1996) (requiring Industrial
Commission to "provide a patrty in interest actual or constructive notice of an order
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for such party to timely file a petition for judicial review); see also Utah Code Ann. §
34A-1 -302(4) (1997) (requiring Labor Commission to give "notice of the entry of a
presiding officer's order or any order or award of the commission" by mailing copy
of said order to last-known address). Because there is no mailing certificate in the
record, we cannot be assured that Joseph received appropriate notice of the order
signed on July 19, 2000, and, therefore, even if the order had been certified and
"issued" on the date, it may not be appropriate to begin counting the appeal period
from July 19 th.
The Commission failed to produce a written certified order to compel the Petitioner
to produce anything and then effectively gave the City an open-ended fishing license to seek
discovery of items not relevant to the matter before the Commission, and at the time not
available in the matter of Westley Scott v. Salt Lake City et. aL This Court should conclude
that the Commission's order to compel was not valid because the Commission failed to
comply with their own rules and regulations and in so doing violated the Petitioner's
due process rights. (R. 001-02).
(B). The Commission acted with prejudice and abused it's discretion when it
attempted to compel Officer Joseph to produce evidence not relevant
to the case.
Although the Commission is not bound by formal rules of evidence and procedure, it
is not above the law. See Tolman. 818 P.2d at 31. In the absence of formal legal rules, the
Commission must "determine what evidence should, in 'fairness,1 be admitted." Id. The
evidence must be legally relevant, in that it has '"some probative weight and reliability/" Id.
(citation omitted)- "Whether certain evidence is relevant... is a question of law, which we
review under a correction-of-error standard." State v. Gonzales. 822 P.2d 1214,1216 (Utah
Ct App. 1991).
The Civil Service Commission is a local, municipal tribunal of limited jurisdiction. See
Piercev v. Civil Serv. Comm'n. 116 Utah 135,141,208 P.2d 1123,1125-26 (1994); accord Salt

21

Lake Gty Corp.- 908 P.2d at 875.. Th^ Commission is neither a court of law nor a state
administrative agency subject to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). See
Tolman, 818 P.2d at 26 n.3 (stating Ujf\PA only applies to state, not local, agency action). In
addition, as a municipal administrative! body, the Commission is not bound by formal rules
of evidence and procedure. See Salt Like City Civil Service Commission, Rules and
Regulations 7-6-6. Conduct of Hearing. (1997):
1.

Hearing Requirements. All parties must be fully apprised of the evidence
submitted to or to be considered by the Commission, and must be given the
opportunity to cross examine witnesses, to inspect documents, and to offer
evidence in explanation or rebuttal. Further, the Commission must address the
factual and legal contentions raised by the parties.

2.

Rules of Evidence. Hearings before the Commission are conducted with
appropriate formality and decorum so that the due process rights of all parties
are protected and the Commission may perform its function. Utah Rules of
Evidence and Utah Ru/eslqf CivilProcedure are used as guidelines in the conduct of
commission hearings, but are not strictly followed or applied. In keeping with
its goal of obtaining alljpertinent facts, die Commission does not stricdy apply
rules of evidence regarding authentication, foundation, hearsay or relevance.

See Pilcher v. State DepTt of Soc Servs.. 663 P.2d 450,453 (Utah 1983)
("Administrative proceedings are usuilly conducted with greaterflexibilityand informality
than judicial proceedings!, thus,] [rjigid adherence to judicial procedures in administrative
proceedings is generally inappropriate because it ignores basic differences between judicial
and administrative procedures.").
The Commission didn't inquire as to the relevancy o£ the tapes, nor did they inquire
as to the actual content of the tapes. The Petitioner had not at any time indicated that he
would be using any of the tapes in the matter before the Commission. Ms. Stonebrook on
the other hand stipulated on several occasions that she did not intend to retry the
Petitioner's deadly force case and tha|t the Commission would only be looking at evidence
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relevant to the Petitioner's termination or fitness for duty issue. (R> 121-22).
Ms. Stonebrook abused the Civil Service Commission and sought by threat of
dismissal evidence not relevant to the matter before the Commission by exploiting
alternative procedures in violation of the Petitioner's due process rights.
Completely ignored in the City's Motion to Enforce is the fact that the issue of the
tapes was concurrently raised in other civil litigation involving the Gty, in which Ms,
Stonebrook is acting as counsel. During depositions in that case Ms. Stonebrook told
Joseph's attorney Bruce Oliver, that Joseph had to produce two tapes by the 30th of March.
These two tapes were produced to Ms. Stonebrook. Later, the parties in the civil litigation
discussed other tapes after they were referred to in Joseph's deposition. It was agreed that
Mr. Oliver and Joseph's other defense counsel, would review all of the tapes, would copy all
conversations involving City employees on separate tapes, would then make complete copies
of those tapes, and distribute them to all the parties in the litigation. One of those parties is
the City, represented by Ms. Stonebrook. Ms. Stonebrook apparently agreed to this
arrangement and understood that she would receive copies of all relevant tapes. (R.115-16).
In the City's Motion to Enforce dated April 2,2001, Ms. Stonebrook omits the fact
that the Petitioner delivered some 258 pages of requested documents on March 30, 2001 and
then produced the two requested tapes on April 2,2001, prior to thefilingof the Motion to
Enforce. Mr. Stonebrook also fails mention that she has reviewed the tapes and then refused
to return them to the Petitioner. (R. 116).
The City had been previously notified by the Petitioner's attorney, Erik Strindberg,
that he would be out of the office on March 30, 2001 and would be able to review the two
requested tapes until Monday April 2, 2001. The Petitioner delivered the tapes to Strindberg
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by March 30, 2001, and the tapes wer^ then reviewed by Strindberg and delivered to the City
by midday April 2,2001. (RAM).
Ms. Stonebrook states in her potion to Enforce dated April 2, 2001, that she became
aware that the Petitioner had many tapes during depositions in Westly Scott v. Salt Lake City
and Robert Joseph, et al. These deposition took place on March 26 & 27, 2001 The
Petitioner was also involved in deposition of Westley Scott which took place on March 29,
2001. It was during the time of this deposition that Ms. Stonebrook demanded that the
Petitioner produce all tapes referred to during his deposition from the day before by the
close of business on March 30, 2001 (me following day) under threat of dismissal without any
discussion as to the tapes relevancy to the matter before the Commission. (R. 071-73).
The Petitioner's attorney, Bruce Oliver informed Ms. Stonebrook and the other five
attorneys present in the depositions mat no tapes would be released before he had the
opportunity to review the tapes. It wis agreed that the Petitioner would provide the tapes to
attorney Roger Bullock who would review the tapes with Bruce Oliver and determine which
tapes will be duplicated and provided! to the various other attorney's including Ms.
Stonebrook. (R.110-132).
Ms. Stonebrook's demand wa£ unreasonable and her attempts to extort the Petitioner
to produce the tapes under threat of dismissal was inappropriate and a violation of the
Petitioner's due process rights. The jFact that the Petitioner was given one day (March 30,
2001) to produce the tapes as disclosed during depositions between March 26-29 was
unreasonable and overly burdensome, not to mentionfinanciallyimpossible for the
Petitioner. Issues related to who would bear the cost of production were not finalized until
the following week when it was determined that Roger Bullock, the City's appointed counsel
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for the Petitioner and co-counsel with the Gty in Westley Scott v. Salt Lake City & Robert
Joseph et al., would bear the cost of production and distribution. (R. 171-75; 102-3; 106-7).
The Petitioner eventually produced 37 tapes containing over 80 different
conversations to Bruce Oliver and Roger Bullock who in turn provided them to the City
'"Ms. Stonebrook" after they had been reviewed and duplicated. The tapes were relevant to
the case Westly Scott v. Salt Lake City & Robert Joseph et. al., but were outside the
stipulated guidelines made by Ms. Stonebrook for the civil service hearing on the Petitioner's
termination. Ms. Stonebrook stipulated a number of times that she would not retry the
Petitioner's deadly force appeal and would not except any evidence in the hearing not
directly related to the Petitioner's fitness for duty. The only tape that had any relevance
to the Petitioner's fitness for duty was the tape recorded interview with the departments
psychologist, Dr. McCann which was provided to the City on April 2,2001.
In light of these additional facts, all of which were omitted by the City's Motion to
Enforce, dismissal of the Petitioner's grievance is at best punitive. The Commission had not
set an actual hearing date for the termination grievance and even refused to do so at its
March 15,2001, hearing. (R. 066-7). Accordingly, there has been, and will be, absolutely no
prejudice to the City. (R116).
The City fails to establish how these procedural errors were harmful, e.g., the City
was prejudiced by failure to produce the tapes by March 30, 2001, when there was no date
set for the hearing or, the City did not have time to prepare for die hearing or, how these
procedures would have resulted in a different outcome absent such errors. See, e.g.,
Loudermill 470 U.S. at 547,105 S. Ct. at 1496; cf. State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913,920 (Utah
1987) ("mite likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine
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confidence in [the decision].");State v. fyillarreal 857 P.2d 949, 958 (Utah Ct App. 1993)
(stating evidence must be "sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no
'reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings'" (quoting State
v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116,120 (Utah 1989)), aff d, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995))).
"[a]n erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence does not constitute reversible
error unless the error is harmful." Cal IWadsworth Constr. v. St George, 898 R2d 1372,1378
(Utah 1995).
This Court should find that thfe Commission abused its discretion and acted with bias
and prejudice in violation of the Petitioner's due process rights while attempting to serve the
City's interests.
(C). The Commission acted with prejudice and violated Officer Joseph's due
process rights when it Allowed Martha Stonebrook to act as counsel for the
Commission,
The Commission exceeded its| statutorily limited authority in allowing Martha
Stonebrook to act as its legal advisor to actively participate, and make sua sponte rulings as
to the admissibility of evidence during the hearing. A conflict would arise if the
Commission's legal advisor simultaneously served as both an advocate and an advisor. See
Hamilton v. City of Mesa. 916 P.2d 1136,1143 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). However, absent a
showing of any actual bias or partiality, there is no due process violation. See, e.g., id.
(holding city manager seeking advice from independent legal advisor, absent showing of
actual bias or partiality, insufficient to establish due process violation).
Because Section § 10-3-1012 confers upon civil service employees a property interest
in continued employment, we must determine what process is due. The essential principle of
due process requires that a deprivation of any significant property interest "be preceded by
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notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.- 339 US. 306,313,70 S. Ct 652, 656-57 (1950) (emphasis
added). "An employee's right to fair notice and an opportunity to 'present his [or her] side of
the story' before discharge is not a matter of legislative grace, but of'constitutional
guarantee.'" Loudermill 470 U.S. at 541,105 S. Ct. at 1493. Post-deprivation procedures,
while not constitutionally guaranteed, must comport with due process requirements
providing for a fair hearing. See Loudermill 470 U.S. at 546,105 S. Ct at 1496 (stating due
process requires post-termination administrative procedures "at a meaningful time" as
provided by statute); see also Bunnell v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331,1333 (Utah
1987) ("[E]very person who brings a claim in a court or at a hearing held before an
administrative agency has a due process right to receive a fair trial in front of a fair
tribunal.").
The Commission acted with bias against the Petitioner during the Motion to Strike
hearing when it looked to Ms. Stonebrook for counsel on matters of law, which is evident in
statements made by Commission.
RR:

I think Ms. Stonebrook has an argument that maybe, will be informative to
those of us who are not lawyers. What about the question of due process?
(R. 198)

The fact that Ms. Stonebrook is representing the Commission against the Petitioner
in the other matters before this Court and at the same time is lead counsel for the City in
Robert Joseph v. Salt Lake City and Wesdey Scott v. Salt Lake City and Joseph et. al.,
demonstrates a clear conflict of interest. Matters before the Commission, and Ms.
Stonebrook's involvement as counsel could have a profound impact on the outcome of
other cases before the Federal Courts. Ms. Stonebrook has a vested interest in the outcome
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of these cases and any legal advisory role is inappropriate and a violation of the Petitioner's
right to a fair and impartial hearing. The Petitioner has been prejudiced by Ms. Stonebrook's
involvement and there has been a clear disparity of treatment in matters of discovery.
Ms. Stonebrook has failed to provide the Petitioner with his first request for
discovery by failing to produce his corpplete pre-employment evaluation. The basis of the
Petitioner's termination on March 31 2000, was Dr. McCann's psychological evaluation in
which he believed that the Petitioner naad been suffering from psychological problems since
adolescence. Dr. McCann's evaluatioii comprised of approximately one hour interview in
which he attempted to convince the Petitioner that his claims of civil rights violations by the
City against him were "unjustified doubts." The Petitioner's pre-employment evaluation in
1997 by Dr. Thomas Reidy however, comprised of hours of testing and interviews that did
not show any sign of present or past psychological problems. This was also confirmed in
the Petitioner's post shooting evaluation in 1998, and in two subsequent evaluations by two
different evaluators. The Petitioner's pomplete pre-employment evaluation is harmful to the
City's case.
The City has failed to produc^ his complete pre-employment evaluation which is
paramount to the termination appeal before the Commission and had not been provided at
the time of the March 15,2001, hearing in which Ms. Stonebrook demanded tapes not
relevant to the case or not intended to be used by the Petitioner, under threat of dismissal.
It is apparently clear, that the Commission looked to Ms. Stonebrook for advise on matters
of law, and allowed her to exploit by alternative procedures evidence intended for use in
other matters outside the Commission. The Petitioner has been prejudiced by the
Commission's actions and there has (been an obvious disparity in matters of discovery and a
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violation of the Petitioner's due process rights.
The scope of authority given to administrative agencies is limited. The Utah
Constitution delegates all power to charter such agencies to the State Legislature. Utah
Const. Art. XI, Sec.5. The Legislature has narrowly tailored the organization and authority of
agencies. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1001 to 06. The Utah Supreme Court has held that
whenever a question arises as to whether an administrative agency has the authority to act in
a manner not expressly provided by statute, courts must error towards restricting the
agency's authority rather than allowing un-permitted acts to occur. Williams v. Public Serv.
Comm'n. 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988). Courts reviewing actions of commissions "should be
bound by the principle" that when a "specific power is conferred by statute upon
a...commission with limited powers, [its] powers are limited to such as are specifically
mentioned." Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Common. 134 P.2d 469, 474 (Utah 1943)
(emphases added). 'To ensure that the administrative powers of the [Commission] are not
overextended, any reasonable doubt of the existence of any power must be resolved against
the existence thereof." Williams. 754 P.2d at 50. Furthermore, the Utah Code requires a civil
service commission to create and presumably follow its own rules and regulations. See Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1006. See Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission, Rules and Regulations
1-3-2, Civil Service Commission- Legal Counsel. (1997).
Legal Counsel for the Commission may be provided, as necessary, by the Office of
the City Attorney. When such representation is provided by the City Attorney, due
care should be taken to avoid possible conflicts of interest. In cases of conflict of
interest, independent counsel may be retained by the Commission in accordance with
Section 2.16.060 of the Salt Lake Code- (emphases added).
The Commission erred in granting the City's motion to compel the Petitioner to
produce the evidence without giving any reasoning and without making any findings or
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conclusions to support its decision. This court has emphasized that an administrative agency
must make findings of fact that are suffidentiy detailed so as to permit meaningful appellate
review. See Adams v. Board of Reviewf of Indus. Comm'n. 821 R2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
For us to meaningfully review the Board's findings, the findings must be
"'"suffidentiy detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached" . . . . The failure of
an agency to make adequate findings of fact in material issues renders its findings
"arbitrary and capridous" unless the evidence is "clear, uncontroverted and capable of
only one conclusion.1"" Id.at 4|5 (quoting Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm'n, 800 R2d
330, 335 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted)). In this case, the Commission's
dedsion granting Murray City's Motion in Limine without providing any findings,
conclusions, or reasoning was Arbitrary and capridous. Therefore, the Commission
abused its discretion.
This Court should find that thfe Petitioner's due process rights were violated by the
Commission which greatly prejudiced the Petitioner's right to a full and impartial hearing by
having Ms. Stonebrook represent and advise the Commission on matters of law. (R. 198;
see also, Robert Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission No: 20001111-CA).
Due process is not a technical)(conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place, and circumstances; it is flexibl and requires such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands. In an analysis of a procedure, an important factor is the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of a private interest through the procedures, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards."
POINT IL
DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL IS AN ABUSE OF OFFICER JOSEPH'S DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS.
Section 10-3-1012 states the Commission "shall fully hear and determine" appeals
of suspension or termination brought by civil service employees. The Utah Supreme
Court, in Vetterli v. Civil Service Commission. 106 Utah 83,145 P.2d 792 (1944),
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established that the Commission's review of disciplinary decisions involves two inquiries:
(1) Do the facts support the charges made by the department head, and, if so, (2) do the
charges warrant the sanction imposed? See idat 796; Vitek v. Jones. 720 P.2d 1356,1361
(Utah 1986). If the Commission answers no to either of these inquiries, it must reverse the
department head's actions.
Furthermore, under the specific circumstances of this case, the second question-"do
the charges warrant the sanction imposed," In re Discharge of Jones. 720 P,2d 1356,1361
(Utah 1986)-breaks down into two sub-questions: First, is the sanction proportional; and
second, is the sanction consistent with previous sanctions imposed by the department
pursuant to its own policies. Sjge Lucas v. Murray Gty Civ. Serv. Comm'n. 949 P. 2d 746,
761 (Utah Ct App. 1997).
(A)» The Commissions Findings, Ruling and Punishment were Inconsistent
and Grossly Disproportionate to the Offense,
Dismissal is an excessive disciplinary action for his alleged offense. In this case in
determining whether the charges warrant the disciplinary action taken, the Court must
consider several factors. Firsdy, was the Commission's order to compel valid according to
their own rules, and in compliance with the law. Secondly, were the requested tapes relevant
to the matter before the Commission. Thirdly, was the request abuse of office allowing Ms.
Stonebrook to use the Commission to gain access to evidence through exploiting alternative
procedures. Fourthly, did the failure to produce the tapes by March 30,2001, somehow
prejudiced the City when there was no hearing date set.
In considering these factors the Court will conclude that the Commission abused
discretion and exceeded the range of sanctions permitted by statute or regulation, or if, in
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light of all the circumstances, the punishment was disproportionate to the offense. See id.;
see also Bovce v. United States. 543 F 2d 1290,1295 (Ct CI. 1976) ("'If a penalty is so harsh
as to constitute an abuse, rather than in exercise of discretion, it cannot be allowed to
stand/" (citations omitted)).
The City "Ms. Stonebrook" caiinot simply demand that the Petitioner turn over
irrelevant material and then use his reticence as a basis to seek dismissal of this action. The
Petitioner has in good faith attempted to cooperate with Ms. Stonebrook's global requests
for irrelevant materials without placing in jeopardy other matters before the Federal
Courts.
In disciplinary proceedings, a public body must comply with it's own rules and an
employee being disciplined is entitled to rely upon those rules. " Bell v. Civil Serv. Comm'a
515 N.R2.d 248,252 (III. Ct. App. l|987)
When this discretion is abused, however, if the punishment exceeds the range of
sanctions permitted by statute or regulation, or if, in light of all the circumstances, the
punishment is disproportionate to tlie offense. See id.; See also Bovce v. United States,
543 F.2d 1290,1295 (Ct. CI. 1976) ("If a penalty is so harsh as to constitute an abuse, rather
than an exercise of discretion, it cannot be allowed to stand.1") (citations omitted).
The Petitioner acknowledges that he has no history of inconsistency to turn to, he is
not without recourse. While the Petitioner may have no basis to claim (disparity, the
Petitioner still retains the protection) of proportionality review. See Vitek v. Jones. 720 P.2d
1356,1361 (Utah 1986)
If this Court concludes that tfhe Commission's order was indeed valid, and that the
request for irrelevant tapes was not m abuse of discretion by the Commission, then this
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Court should consider that the Commission's ruling and Order of Dismissal was grossly
disproportionate to the offense and overturn the Order of Dismissal and remand the case
back to the Commission for a hearing.
CONCLUSION
The Commission's decision to Dismiss the Petitioners termination hearing was a
gross violation of State and Federal Constitutional Due Process Rights. The Commission's
conduct was bias and prejudice towards the City's "self-serving interests." The Commission's
conduct and ruling was not based on law, was unreasonable, and clearly arbitrary capricious
and draconian. The City, (Martha Stonebrook) inappropriately acted as counsel for the
Commission in an obvious "conflict of interest."
The City has repeatedly failed to produce evidence (Joseph's complete preemployment evaluation) and denied the existence of evidence (Sgt Whites merit rating of
Officer Joseph) beneficial to the Petitioner's case. The City has shown an obvious disparity
when dealing with issues of discovery.
The Commission failed to certify, or even issue an order to compel the Petitioner to
produce anything, and then enforced an unofficial order. The Commission granted the City
a global request for discovery and acted with bias when it attempted to extort the Petitioner
into providing tapes for the City that were irrelevant to the termination hearing.
First and foremost, this Court should recognize that the City and the Commission
violated the Petitioners due process rights, acted with bias and prejudice in favor of the
City's "self-servicing interests." The Commission failed to certify an order to compel the
Petitioner to do anything, failed to identify specifically what items it wanted or what the
relevancy of the items were to the case before them. Secondly, the Commission issued
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an Order of Dismissal before the Petitioner's could respond to the City's Motion to
Enforce.
This Court should recognize that the City's request for all the tapes was unreasonable,
overly broad, burdensome, and irrelevant to the matter before the Commission. This
Court should also conclude that the Commission dismissed the Petitioner's appeal without
good cause and that their decision could not have reasonably have been based on any law or
the evidence presented by the City to show relevancy, which lacked substantial support.
Therefore, the Court should order Salt Lake City to reinstate Officer Joseph
with full back pay, benefits and retirement The Petitioner also pleas to the Court that the
City be ordered to pay reasonable legal fees in connection with the Civil Service Hearings
and the matter before the this Court.
Alternatively, the Petitioner pl^as to the Court that the case be remanded back to the
Commission for a hearing based upoiji the Commission's abuse of the Petitioners due
process rights.
DATED this R ^ D a y of September, 2001.
By Petitioner Pro-se

Robert L. Joseph
Petitioner's Address:
1156 E. Lost Eden Dr.
Sandy, Utah 84094
(801)571-3098
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personaUy served VIA HAND DELIVERY a true and
correct copy of the foregoing on this 1"* day of September 2001, to:
Chief Charles "Rick" Dinse
Salt Lake City Police Department
315 East 200 South
Eighth Floor Administration
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Martha Stonebrook
Assistant City Attorney
451 South State St, #505
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Salt Lake Civil Service Commission
John R Robertson
Richard Reike
Linda Kruse
451 South State St, #115
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Robert L. Joseph
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